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Revenue assignments in the practice
of fiscal decentralization1
Jorge M artinez-Vazquez

1

INTRODUCTION

O ver the past tw o decades there has been an unprecedented move toward
decentralized governance all over the world. These changes have taken
special significance in m any developing and transitional countries where
centralized systems were perceived to have failed to deliver improved
general welfare. The prom ise o f political, adm inistrative and fiscal decen
tralization is that it can strengthen dem ocratic representative institutions,
increase the overall efficiency o f the public sector and lead to improved
social and econom ic welfare for countries that decide to adopt it.
O ne critical assum ption in expecting these benefits is that decentral
ized governm ents will generally be m ore accountable and responsive
to citizens' needs an d preferences th a n centralized governm ents were
in the past. A t th e sam e time, there is general agreem ent am ong experts
in decentralization that the increased accountability associated with
decentralizatio n can only be assured when sub-national governm ents
have an ad eq u ate level o f au to n o m y an d discretion in raising their own
revenues.
Thus, if effective fiscal decentralization requires meaningful revenue
autonom y at the regional and local levels o f governm ent, the question is,
which taxes should be allocated at these levels? This is know n in the fiscal
decentralization literature as the ‘tax assignm ent problem ’.2 In a chapter
like this, which is strictly focused on revenue assignm ents, it is im portant to
m ake clear th a t revenue assignm ent is ju st one elem ent in the design o f
the entire system o f governm ent decentralization and that if revenue a u to n 
om y is to w ork effectively to increase accountability it has to be within
the context o f o th er well-designed institutions in a decentralized system.
D ecentralization involves m ore th an w hat are traditionally thought o f as
fiscal decentralization issues (revenue assignm ents, the assignm ents o f
expenditure functions, transfers, and so on); and w hat is thought o f as
political decentralization, with dem ocratically elected officials; and what is
27
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thought o f as adm inistrative decentralization - in particular in what per
tains to civil service issues. All are im p o rtan t in assuring good outcom es
from decentralization.
A com m on m istake in som e countries recently involved in decentraliza
tion reform has been to ignore the ‘com pleteness’ o f decentralized systems
and to have focused on som e form o f revenue decentralization alone (e.g.,
central governm ent revenue-sharing with local governments). T he conse
quences have been not only the failure to capture the benefits o f decen
tralization, but also central governm ent deficits and m acroeconom ic
instability.3 T he well-known dictum th at ‘finance should follow function’
reflects the w isdom that revenue assignm ents should come after the assign
m ent o f expenditure responsibilities has been com pleted.4 The m ain goal
o f this chap ter is to provide a policy overview and update on the problem
o f revenue assignm ents, an aspect o f fiscal decentralization design with
which developing countries, and also m any developed countries, continue
to struggle. T he organization o f the ch ap ter is as follows. Section 2 reviews
the perspectives that can be taken on the nature o f revenue assignments.
Section 3 exam ines w hat we w ant from revenue assignments. Section 4
reviews different forms o f revenue autonom y, while Section 5 lists the fun
dam ental principles o f tax assignm ent. Section 6 studies the different tax
instrum ents that are available for assignm ent at the sub-national level.
Section 7 briefly reviews th e international experience with tax assignments,
with a special focus on new developm ents for the feasibility o f sub-national
VATs. Section 8 sum m arizes and concludes.

2

PERSPECTIVES ON REVENUE ASSIGNMENTS

T he theory and practice o f revenue assignm ents asks two fundam ental
questions:5 1) W hat taxes should be assigned to different levels o f govern
ment? 2) H ow should these arrangem ents be im plemented? These two ques
tions are typically exam ined from a norm ative perspective using efficiency
and equity criteria, as we also do in m ost o f this chapter. However, it can
be insightful to study revenue assignm ents from a political econom y per
spective, an approach taken m uch less frequently. This approach can be
helpful in addressing several im p o rtan t puzzles in the practice o f revenue
assignm ents, for which the com m only used norm ative criteria o f equity and
efficiency offer little o r no help.
The first puzzle is that it is com m on to observe in the practice o f fiscal
federalism significant deviations from w hat would be acceptable o r recom 
m ended und er the norm ative criteria. O ften in the literature these devi
ations are brushed aside as being the product o f ‘the dead hand o f history’.
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However, in m any cases what needs to be explained is not so much why
certain revenue assignm ents cam e into being, since historical factors and
circum stance can no d o u b t play a role, but why are w rong (inefficient,
inequitable and so on) assignm ents so difficult to reform?6 Part o f the
answ er has to be in the unequal bargaining position sub-national govern
m ents have with respect to central powers. The counter example o f the
weak central pow ers in the history o f federalism in N o rth America is a case
in point. But, this is a question th at still rem ains to be studied fully in the
literature. A second puzzle in revenue assignm ents is not so much in the
design but in the actual im plem entation. Very often the revenue authority
provided to sub-national governm ents in the law goes unused, while at the
same time these sub-national governm ents cry out for m ore funding from
their central governm ent. A political econom y perspective can also be o f
help here. Revenue assignm ent is just one m ode o f financing sub-national
governm ents and when the incentives are right, it is to be expected that
these governm ents will prefer to be financed by transfers from the central
governm ent as opposed to asking their residents directly to contribute to
the refunds. In the absence o f a hard budget constraint and adequate
revenue autonom y, m any behave in a fiscally irresponsible manner, asking
for ever-increasing national transfers, perhaps under the erroneous collec
tive belief that residents o f o th er sub-national governm ents will foot the
bill. Systems where sub-national governm ents can count on ever-increasing
revenue-sharing and o th er transfers from the central governm ent become
ju st an o th er m anifestation o f the well-known problem o f the ‘tragedy o f
the com m ons’.
However, as we will see below in this chapter, th e theory o f public
finance provides helpful guidelines on the assignm ent problem , but these
guidelines are fa r from being determ inistic an d in som e cases the guide
lines can conflict w ith each other. Thus, it should n o t be surprising to find
significant diversity in th e actu al im plem entation o f revenue assignm ents;
it is well accepted th a t there is n o unique o r ‘one-size-fits-all’ tax
assignm ent. F or b etter o r worse, the history and institutions o f particu 
lar coun tries also m atter significantly. So, in practice, the choice o f
assignm ents has to d o as m uch w ith politics as with econom ic principles.
In additio n , we should expect the 'p referred ' tax assignm ents to change
over tim e w ith changes in the econom y, for exam ple in response to glob
alization, as well as w ith changes in w hat we could call the available ‘tech
nology’ o f tax assignm ent. For exam ple, until recently, sub-national
VATs had been considered unfeasible, but this position has changed as
the result o f several intellectual innovations, to be discussed later in the
chapter.
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WHAT DO WE WANT FROM REVENUE
ASSIGNMENTS?

The m ost fundam ental purpose o f revenue assignm ents is to get adequate
levels o f financing so th a t sub-national governm ents can im plem ent
the functions that have been assigned to them . However, this requirem ent
does not offer m uch o f a guide for revenue assignm ents because adequate
financing levels can be obtained from m any different tax assignm ents or
even w ithout them through intergovernm ental transfers.
The m ore critical requirem ent for revenue assignm ents is to provide
revenue autonom y as the m eans o f enhancing political accountability
am ong sub-national officials. There are several other benefits from revenue
autonom y. When all financing o f sub-national governm ents is from revenuesharing and oth er forms o f transfers from higher-level governments, there
is a danger that sub-national governm ents will becom e spending agents o f
the center becom ing less interested an d efficient,7 and that imposing a hard
budget constraint on sub-national governm ents becomes more difficult.8
Sub-national tax auto n o m y is the best way, if not the only way, to address
in a perm anent way the difficult problem o f vertical imbalances, o r m is
m atch o f expenditure needs and revenue sources at different governm ent
levels. A dequate revenue auto n o m y is also a key indicator o f sub-national
governm ents’ borrow ing capacity an d creditw orthiness. There is also some
evidence that m ore revenue au tonom y at the sub-national level is associated
with greater m acroeconom ic stability.9
O n the oth er h and, greater tax au to n o m y can lead, depending on the
geographical distribution o f econom ic activity and tax bases, to larger h o r
izontal fiscal disparities across sub-national governments. Richer jurisdic
tions can have the ability to finance th eir expenditure needs with little effort,
while poorer com m unities may have to exert m uch greater tax effort with
their residents to provide for their expenditure needs. However, these h o ri
zontal fiscal disputes can be addressed quite well through the proper design
o f equalization grants.
If we agree th at tax autonom y is p aram o u n t, then we need to ask: how
m uch tax autonom y is needed? S h o u ld n ’t sub-national governm ents be
asked to finance them selves entirely from au to n o m o u s tax sources? The
answ er is th at full own-financing by all sub-national governm ents is gener
ally n o t feasible o r even desirable. T h e generally accepted rule is th at sub
national governm ents need to raise their own funds at the m argin and
operate with hard budget constraints, which m eans that revenue-sharing
and g rants should represent only infra-m arginal funding.10
In reality we tend to observe low levels o f tax autonom y. One reason, dis
cussed in the previous sections, involves simple political econom ic forces.
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C entral governm ents m ay not want to devolve taxing powers for fear o f
com peting with local governm ents for the sam e taxing base and at the same
time sub-national governm ents do not w ant to take on the responsibility o f
m aking politically u n p o p u lar taxing decisions to meet their budget needs.
Using intergovernm ental transfers is seen as a much easier path for all
concerned.
Insufficient revenue autonom y can also be the result o f the lack o f adm in
istrative capacity in some sub-national governments. When low capacity is
com bined with the desire to provide all sub-national governm ents (regard
less o f size and capacity) with the same autonom ous taxing powers, low
levels o f tax autonom y can follow. This situation poses a dilem m a in decen
tralization design. A uniform intergovernm ental fiscal system under which
all sub-national governm ents must operate has an im portant appeal. If all
sub-national governm ents have the sam e expenditure responsibilities and
revenue-raising powers, m anagem ent o f the system and evaluation o f its
success are made easier. U niform treatm ent o f all sub-national governments
also seems generally fairer. On the other hand, a more effective route for
effective decentralization may be the adoption o f an asym m etric tax assign
ment providing m ore tax autonom y to larger sub-national governments
with m ore capacity and according to transparent objective criteria and let
the sm aller ones ‘grow into this role’ over tim e.11
A lthough decentralized systems in som e developed countries have high
levels o f tax autonom y, in reality it is quite rare, especially am ong develop
ing countries to find significant taxing pow ers devolved to sub-national
governm ents at the onset o f decentralization. Often, there is considerable
reluctance from central governm ent to let go o f part o f its authority and
control over taxes, which in turn is justified because o f the need to facilitate
attainm en t o f proper capacity at the sub-national level. However, these
stum bling blocks generally linger for m any years o f a decentralization
program , with the side effect o f a culture o f dependency taking hold where
sub-national governm ents have become accustom ed to relying on central
transfers for their financing needs.
Regardless o f actual practice, it is undeniable that a goal for revenue
assignm ents in all countries rem ains granting sub-national governm ents a
high level o f tax autonom y. However, the general principle o f providing
sufficient tax auto n o m y at the m argin is n o t easily operationalized. In p a r
ticular, w hat is the specific m eaning o f ‘sufficient tax autonom y at the
m argin’? Here are som e difficulties. E xpenditure needs (and their changes)
are very often hard to quantify properly. In addition, tax autonom y leads
to horizontal fiscal disparities giving rise to the need for equalization
grants. But then the question becomes how m uch are central governm ents
willing and able to equalize?
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A lthough there are no certain answers, it is possible to provide some
guidance to policy m akers responsible for the design o f revenue assign
ments. First, quite obviously there is a need to devise some sensible way to
m easure the expenditure needs o f sub-national governm ents and to keep
these m easurem ents reasonably updated. N ext, the golden rule for revenue
assignm ent should be th at these assignm ents should be sufficient to fund
the expenditure needs (net o f conditional grants) o f the w ealthiest sub
national governm ents. Sometimes, however, it may be advisable to break
this rule som ew hat an d to have even the wealthiest sub-national govern
m ents partly financed by central transfers. This may be because o f vertical
externalities in the use o f tax bases, econom ies o f scale in the adm inistra
tion o f some taxes, the need to m aintain the integrity (harm onized nature)
o f some taxes, and oth er considerations in tax adm inistration, which are
discussed below.

4

IMPLEMENTING REVENUE ASSIGNMENTS:
WHAT FORM OF TAX AUTONOMY?

If we accept th at tax au tonom y for sub-national governm ents is the
requirem ent in revenue assignm ents, then we need to address two questions:
1) W hat type o f revenue au to n o m y is desirable? 2) W hat kind o f tax instru
m ents should be used to provide this autonom y? W ith respect to the form
o f tax autonom y, four dim ensions have been identified in the literature.12
T he first is which level o f governm ent has the right to choose the taxes that
this given level can impose. T here are good reasons to limit the ability o f
sub-national governm ents, for exam ple to introduce internal tariffs, as done
with the interstate constitutional clause in the U nited States. Provided that
these general restrictions are to be in place, there is a choice between an
open list o f taxes to be determ ined by the sub-national governm ents within
general limits an d restrictions, o r instead a closed list o f allowable taxes
determ ined at the national level from which sub-national governm ents can
choose. T here is no clear choice betw een these two approaches as there are
advantages an d disadvantages associated w ith each. Overall, a closed list o f
sub-national taxes is preferable because it avoids the introduction o f nui
sance taxes in some cases o r higher and inefficient distortionary taxes that
can easily im pede local econom ic developm ent and grow th.13 But, a closed
list may not be needed if, for exam ple, all tax bases are nationally legislated
and harm onized. However, this alternative may be interpreted as just
an o th er version o f a closed-list choice. In the international experience,
where sub-national governm ents are given m ore constitutional discre
tion, as in the case o f som e federal systems, open lists w ith som e general
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restrictions are com m on. Closed lists are used m ore frequently in unitary
systems o f governm ent.
W hether an open-list or closed-list approach is adopted, an additional
decision needs to be m ade as to w hether the base o f specific taxes should
be used exclusively by one level o f governm ent or w hether these bases
can be used sim ultaneously by several levels o f governm ent. The latter
approach has the disadvantage o f introducing vertical tax externalities due
to the fact that one level will not typically take into account the im pact its
policies may have on the tax base and revenues o f the o ther level o f
governm ent.14
Several corrective policies can be im plem ented to correct for this type o f
externality, including separating tax bases for all levels o f governm ent pro
viding intergovernm ental grants o r increasing the num ber o f sub-national
governm ents.15 In practice, when an open-list approach is chosen it is gen
erally the case that the cohabitation o f bases is allowed. In contrast, it is
often the case that a closed-list approach is used to elim inate the possibil
ity o f the cohabitation o f tax bases. Som etim es the country C onstitution,
even in the case o f som e federal countries, is used to delineate clearly w hat
taxes can be used at different levels o f governm ent (for example, this is the
case in India, P akistan o r Switzerland). T he exclusionary approach to the
use o f tax bases has led in some countries to cum bersom e tax structures.
For example, in India an d Pakistan the federal governm ents can tax ser
vices but only the sub-national governm ent can tax goods. These were
choices m ade m any years back and today they significantly com plicate the
ability to have functional VATs in those countries.
In practice, the choice between exclusive or shared tax bases comes down
to weighing the advantages and disadvantages associated with each choice.
As we ju st discussed, the m ain disadvantage o f cohabitation is vertical exter
nalities. T he m ost im p o rtan t disadvantage o f using the exclusive basis is
that, typically, sub-national governm ents will be shut out o f any op p o rtu n 
ity to use significant (either in size o r elastic over time) tax bases, thus dras
tically reducing any m eaningful possibility o f sub-national tax autonomy.
The im position o f exclusive tax bases can also lead to cum bersom e tax
structures, as in the m entioned cases o f India and Pakistan. All things con
sidered, it appears th at a choice o f a closed list allowing for the cohabitation
of tax bases by different levels o f governm ent and using intergovernm ental
transfers to correct for vertical externalities may be the preferred approach.
The second dim ension o f tax autonom y relates to which level o f govern
ment can legislate over the structure o f the tax bases and which level has dis
cretion to set the tax rates. O f the two types o f autonom y for structuring
sub-national taxes, autonom y to define the tax base is generally less desir
able th an autonom y to set tax rates.16 V ariations in the definition o f the tax
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base, either through especial exclusions from tax, deductions from the tax
base and credits against the tax liabilities can m ore easily lead to complex
ity and lack o f harm onization across jurisdictions.
T he m ost im portant unw anted consequence o f the lack o f harm oniza
tion and com plexity is the higher tax adm inistration cost for all the ju ris
dictions involved and higher com pliance costs for taxpayers who have tax
obligations in several jurisdictions. O n the other hand, autonom y to define
the tax rate generally tends to be m ore desirable because it is sim pler to deal
with across jurisdictions for both tax adm inistrators and taxpayers.
Focusing on autonom y in a tax rate setting has the additional im portant
advantage o f being perceived to generate political accountability.
It is often also argued th a t tax rate setting autonom y may be preferred
because it has a m ore direct im pact on revenues and spending ability o f sub
national jurisdictions, because it has a m ore transparent im pact on loca
tional decisions and fiscal com petition: b o th households and businesses
have an easier tim e figuring out the fiscal exchange o r net benefits provided
by different jurisdictions in their tax-public-service packages when the
differences in tax burdens are expressed in term s o f differences in tax rates.
T he third and last dim ension o f revenue autonom y refers to which level
o f governm ent is put in charge o f adm inistering the various taxes. This
dim ension o f sub-national tax au tonom y is often overlooked a n d in some
cases is sum m arily dismissed as being o f no consequence. In this latter per
spective, centralized tax adm inistration is always m ore efficient and the dis
cussions ab o u t decentralizing tax adm inistration are m ostly ab o u t tu rf and
patronage issues (who can hire workers, an d so on). However, there are
som e potentially im p o rtan t issues here. First, adm inistration by sub
national governm ents o f their own taxes is likely to enhance accountability
at the sub-national level if taxpayers are m ore aware o f sub-national taxes
under this arrangem ent. But second, sub-national tax adm inistration is
likely to be less cost effective because o f econom ies o f scale. Thus, a useful
way to ap proach this decision is to identify a trade-off between m ore
efficient adm inistration, which generally increases with m ore centralized
adm inistration, and enhanced accountability at the sub-national level,
which generally increases with m ore decentralized adm inistration. This
efficiency-accountability trade-off is likely to differ for different taxes. For
example, the efficiency gains from the centralized adm inistration o f sub
national piggyback personal incom e taxes may dom inate any increase in
accountability generated by decentralized adm inistration o f those taxes. In
contrast, there may be no significant efficiency gains in the centralized
adm inistration o f sub-national pro p erty taxes by com parison to the losses
in local accountability im plied by the centralization o f the adm inistration
o f these taxes. The adm inistration o f sub-national taxes o r even shared

Revenue assignments in fiscal decentralization

35

taxes by th e central adm inistration can present a problem with low incen
tives even for shared taxes when the central adm inistration’s share in the
revenues is relatively small. W hat this m eans is that when cost advantages
make it desirable to centralize the adm inistration, there will be a need for
setting incentive-com patible arrangem ents between levels o f governm ent
for the collection o f taxes.17
There is one cost issue we need to discuss briefly before we leave the
issue o f the m ost desirable form o f tax autonom y. It is som etim es argued
th at certain form s o f tax revenue-sharing on a derivation basis can con
tribute to the revenue a u to n o m y o f sub -n atio n al governm ents. T he m ore
generally accepted view is th a t tax-sharing is n o t a form o f revenue assign
m ent because sub-n atio n al governm ents d o n o t have a direct role in the
structure an d ad m in istratio n o f the tax; in this view, revenue-sharing
should be considered ju st a n o th e r form o f transfers. In the m inority view,
shared taxes m ay be considered a form o f tax assignm ent when the shared
rates are stable over a period o f several years an d especially when the
sub-national au th o rities can influence th e level o f adm inistration and
affect the size o f the tax bases. F or these reasons, it is custom ary in m any
tran sitio n al countries, especially those in the form er Soviet U nion, to
consider shared taxes as p a rt o f the own revenues o f sub-national
governm ents.18
There are some other cases that appear ju st to be another form o f taxsharing but in reality are special cases o f tax assignment. For example, cur
rently in Spain some im portant taxes have been partially ceded to regional
governments. For example, 33 per cent o f the personal income tax belongs
to the regional governm ents, but this is not a usual form o f revenue-sharing.
The Spanish law divides the tax schedule for the personal income tax into
a central governm ent schedule and a regional government schedule. In
general, these forms o f revenue assignm ent tend to be less transparent, and
even if they yield equivalent levels o f tax autonom y, they are less likely to
produce the same level o f accountability in com parison to an arrangem ent
with separate tax assignm ents to each level o f government with the regional
governm ents granted several forms o f discretion over their share.19

5

WHAT KIND OF TAX INSTRUMENTS ARE BEST
SUITED FOR SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS?

The principles o f tax assignm ent o r criteria th at should guide the assign
ment o f revenue sources across different governm ent levels in a country
reflect the dual role o f taxes. First, taxes simply provide the m eans to
finance the provision o f public goods and services, but taxes are also used
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as an instrum ent to achieve governm ent policy objectives, such as the redis
trib u tio n o f incom e through progressive taxation.
T he classic startin g p o in t for the principles o f tax assignm ents is
M usgrave’s (1959) sem inal w ork, w here he argued th at th e econom ic
objectives for governm ent are fundam entally threefold: assuring a stable
econom ic environm ent, in which the m arket is able to function; achieving
a m ore equitable d istrib u tio n o f incom e; an d assuring a m ore efficient
allocation o f resources in case th e m arket fails. While, generally, the
know ledge o f circum stances o f tim e an d place m ake decentralized m arket
forces su p erio r to a centralized allocation o f econom ic resources, there
are a n u m b er o f areas w here th e m arket fails because o f cost ad van
tages as in the case o f n a tu ra l m onopolies, the im possibility o f exclu
sion in co n su m p tio n , as in the case o f public goods, o r the presence o f
externalities.
M usgrave’s (1959) ‘three roles’ for governm ent activities can be used to
guide the assignm ent o f revenue sources across different governm ent levels.
After all, different tax instrum ents have varying impacts with respect to the
three functions o f the public sector: m acroeconom ic stabilization, redistri
bution o f income and resource allocation. F u rth er characteristics can be
identified that make certain taxes m ore appropriate for assignm ent at the
sub-national level o f governm ent. A lthough there continues to be some con
troversy on this, the general consensus am ong public finance econom ists is
to agree with M usgrave th at policy decisions on econom ic stabilization
and income distribution are best assigned to the central governm ent,20
while som e o f those related to allocative efficiency (how best to use the
resources available to provide goods and services) may be assigned to local
governments.
Beyond the guidance provided by M usgrave’s governm ental roles, there
are som e characteristics o f taxes th a t are com m only acknowledged as desir
able regardless o f w hether these taxes are to be assigned at the central o r
sub-national levels. These include:
1.
2.

3.

revenue buoyancy, m eaning th at overall, revenues should change
roughly in p ro p o rtio n to the econom ic base;
equity, m eaning th at good revenue sources are ‘fair’ o r equitable in the
sense o f horizontal equity u nder which taxpayers in sim ilar circum 
stances should be treated sim ilarly an d vertical equity under which tax
payers with different incom es should pay according to their ‘ability to
pay’;
efficiency, m eaning that the tax should have relatively low adm inistra
tion and com pliance costs an d create a m inim um o f distortion in the
econom y; and
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political acceptance, m eaning that taxes need to be sensitive to the his
torical and institutional fram ew ork in a country.

There are, in addition, several other principles that are desirable for taxes
that are to be assigned at the sub-national level.21 First, the benefit princi
ple, which relates revenue sources to the benefits being provided, should be
im plem ented to the largest extent possible. Second, sub-national revenue
sources should have a tax base that is relatively evenly distributed across
jurisdictions. This helps to minimize fiscal disparities am ong sub-national
governm ents and reduces the burden put on equalization grants to allow a
m ore uniform quan tity and quality o f services. T hird, sub-national tax
sources should have im m obile bases to minimize the likelihood o f tax com 
petition am ong jurisdictions in a ‘race to the b o tto m ’. However, not all tax
com petition is undesirable; a m oderate tax com petition gives an incentive
to politicians and bureaucrats to be efficient an d to provide services accord
ing to citizens’ preferences in their choice o f taxes. Fourth, sub-national
taxes should be geographically neutral in the sense that they do not inter
fere with dom estic o r international commerce, they do not distort the loca
tion o f econom ic activity across the national territory and they are not
exported such that the taxes levied by a sub-national governm ent are pri
marily borne by residents in oth er jurisdictions. Fifth is a requirem ent for
adm inistrative feasibility so that sub-national taxes can be implemented
w ithout undue costs o f com pliance and adm inistration. C ertain taxes may
be better adm inistered at the local level because o f inform ation advantages
(e.g., property taxes), while for the same reasons local governm ents have a
relative disadvantage in collecting other taxes (e.g., personal income tax).
Sixth, sub-national g rants should exhibit generally stable tax bases; revenue
sources th at are highly sensitive to general econom ic conditions (e.g., profit
taxes) should be assigned to the central governm ent, which has greater
ability to deal with cyclical fluctuations in revenues through borrow ing and
other means. Seventh, sub-national taxes should be highly visible so that
tax burdens are clearly perceived by local residents. O f course, sub-national
governm ents are likely to think quite differently about this. Finally, sub
national tax assignm ents need to be stable over time. A typical problem o f
transitional countries has been unstable assignm ents, with the assignm ents
not being established in perm anent laws but instead decided in annual
budgets. Ad hoc assignm ents decided on an annual basis may also result in
a lack o f uniform ity, unnecessary com plexity and perverse incentives
tow ard revenue m obilization.
One thing sub-national taxes do not need to do is to attem pt to redistrib
ute income through progressive rate structures. This is not only because,
as M usgrave (1959) indicated, income redistribution is a governm ental
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function best perform ed at the central level, but also because the elimina
tion o f some taxes due to their assum ed regressivity may do m ore harm than
good, as for example, in recent years in Sub-Saharan Africa. In these coun
tries, sub-national taxes that are revenue-producing and provide a m ean
ingful degree o f autonom y have been elim inated or there have been calls for
their elim ination because they are regressive; that is, these taxes may require
lower-income taxpayers to pay a greater percentage o f their income in tax
than upper-incom e taxpayers. However, the elimination o f these revenue
sources typically implies a reduction o f local services, which may hurt the
poor m ore because they do n o t have the possibility o f using alternative
private services. The elim ination o f those tax sources also reduces political
accountability at the local level. For example, although user fees are gener
ally regressive, residents regardless o f income would be better off in a com 
munity with safe public w ater sources funded by user fees when com pared
with a com m unity where no safe drinking water is available, and all house
holds have to rely on m ore expensive private provision o f potable water.
Nonetheless, often the regressivity o f local taxes can be m itigated by provi
sions for relief o f hardship and oth er m easures to protect those with the
lowest incomes.

6

SELECTING TAX INSTRUMENTS FOR
ASSIGNM ENT AT THE SUB-NATIONAL LEVEL

There are hardly any taxes th at com ply w ith all desirable criteria listed
above. A com prom ise across criteria is generally needed. But, even though
we can n o t select one single best assignm ent, it is clear th at the criteria allow
us to select am ong better an d w orse tax assignments.
In practice naturally, there are disagreem ents on what should be in the
m inim um list o f requirem ents for tax assignm ent at the sub-national level.
O ne such m inim um list w ould include revenue autonom y at the margin,
stable assignm ents over time, sufficient revenues for the wealthiest sub
national governm ent units an d for taxes to be based as m uch as possible on
the benefit principle an d on less m obile tax bases. But it m ust be clear that
the m inim um list using the benefit principle where feasible is the single m ost
im p o rtan t. As Bird (2000) an d others have argued, sub-national govern
m ents are m ostly prescribed to engage in activities ensuring a m ore efficient
allocation o f public resources, and therefore they should be assigned
revenue sources for which it is easier to establish a link w ith the benefits
received by residents from local governm ent spending. T he m ost obvious
exam ple o f a revenue source satisfying this benefit principle is charging for
specific services provided by local governm ents (for example, the cost o f
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issuing driver’s licenses) an d for goods a n d services provided by public
enterprises (utility charges, m useum adm ission and so on). Besides gener
ating revenue for local governm ents, user charges also provide inform ation
on dem and to public sector officials.
However, often it is n o t feasible to use charges for a variety o f services
provided by sub-national governments. In these cases it may be feasible to
use ‘benefit taxes’, o r com pulsory co n trib u tio n s to local governm ents that
are nonetheless related in som e m anner to benefits received by the tax
payer. F or example, the size o r value o f a residential p roperty may be seen
as relating to an individual taxpayer’s benefits received from im provem ents
on the street where the property is located. Relating taxes to the benefits o f
public spending has the m ajo r advantage o f helping increase the account
ability o f sub-national governm ents to their own constituencies. The
effectiveness o f benefit taxes in increasing political accountability and
fiscal responsibility is enhanced w ith the m obility o f taxpayers across
jurisdictions.
6.1

Better Choices of Sub-national Taxes

A lthough it is n o t possible to come up w ith an exact list o f taxes that must
be assigned to sub-national governm ents, it is quite possible to draft a list
o f taxes th at would m ake good choices for this task:
6.1.1 Fees and user charges
The m ost straightforw ard way to raise revenue in accordance with the
benefit principle is by charging user fees to cover the cost o f providing
specific local governm ent services. As rem arked above, besides generating
revenue for local governm ents, user charges are able to function as a pricing
m echanism , thereby ensuring that locally provided goods are only used by
local residents as long as their benefits exceed the cost to the user. One
feature o f this source o f sub-national revenues is that revenues raised from
user fees and other non-tax revenue sources are generally not available for
general-purpose funding o f local services o r infrastructure.
O ne general argum ent that is som etim es m ade against the reliance on
user fees at the local governm ent level is th at user fees are potentially regres
sive. However, as we have already com m ented, one needs to be careful not
to overstate the im portance o f the redistributional role o f sub-national
governments. In som e sense, considering the regressivity o f user charges
does n o t make m uch m ore sense th an considering, for example, the regres
sivity o f food expenses. As noted earlier, equity and distributional issues are
much better addressed at oth er levels in the overall fiscal system o f the
country.
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To the extent that the m ain purpose o f ‘real’ licenses and user fees is to
recover the adm inistrative costs o f issuing the licenses o r the cost o f p ro 
viding the public services, it is im p o rtan t to price the service right.
Requiring sub-national governm ents to set the fee levels below the actual
cost o f provision im poses an unfunded m andate and it can easily lead to
po o r provision o f services.
While user fees provide im p o rtan t efficiency benefits, it is im portant to
balance the cost o f collecting an d adm inistering user fees with the am ount
o f revenues collected; certain types o f user fees involving m any small tran s
actions may be too costly to collect. It can m ake good sense to bundle the
collection o f a variety o f fees in to a single paym ent. For example, it is pos
sible to collect refuse collection fees o r street lighting fees as a surcharge on
property taxes.
6.1.2 Property taxes and betterment levies
There is am ple consensus in the public finance literature identifying the
property tax as one o f the best m ainstays at the sub-national level.
Som ething else m akes the p roperty tax particu lar in the revenue assign
m ents problem . A lm ost w ithout exception, revenues from the property tax
are assigned to local governm ents as opposed to intermediate-level or
regional governm ents. T he degree o f discretion given to local governm ents
to m anipulate the tax may vary but the thinking that this tax belongs to
local governm ents seems well entrenched.22
Several features m ake prop erty taxes especially attractive as a sub
national tax. M ost im p o rta n t, the p roperty tax is a visible tax and thus
conducive to political accountability. In addition, the tax, for the m ost
p art, falls on an unm ovable base. T he m ore hom ogeneous b o th the p ro p 
erty and popu latio n , the closer the p ro p erty tax comes to being a benefit
tax.23 However, depending o n how the property tax is structured, it can
move away from the benefit link. For exam ple, this may be the case if the
tax burden falls on ju st a few classes o f property, such as non-residential
property.
O th er advantages o f p ro p erty taxes are their revenue p o tential and sta 
bility. N o te also that from a vertical equity view point, the p ro p erty tax can
be progressive in developing countries, a n d therefore can increase the
overall vertical equity o f the tax system , alth o ugh in practice it can be
m ade regressive by exem ption policies th at target w ealthier households.24
T he p ro p erty tax also has the desirable feature that m uch o f the tax
burden is q u ite likely b orne by residents in the jurisdiction where the ser
vices financed by p ro p erty taxes are provided. T he pro p erty tax also has
the advantage th a t it im poses a relatively low com pliance cost on taxpay
ers because taxpayer interv en tio n in term s o f the d eterm ination o f tax
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liability is m inim al, except in the case o f appeals. Typically the property
tax poses no significant problem o f tax base com petition w ith the central
governm ent, basically because this is not a tax that central governm ents
tend to covet.25 Finally, a p art o f prop erty tax m ight be th o u g h t o f as a
charge for land th at can lead to significant im provem ents in the quality o f
land use.
T he m ain draw back o f the property tax is that, perhaps due to its visi
bility it is likely to be u n p o p u lar with taxpayers and, as a result, also with
public officials. O th er draw backs include the fact that it can lead to liquid
ity problem s for hom eow ners with valuable real estate assets but low
incomes.26 In addition, the property tax adm inistration requires costly
revaluation o f property on a regular basis, and it is difficult to enforce,
because the confiscation o f property may be considered to o extreme
because o f the political fallout. Finally, the property tax lacks revenue elas
ticity, m eaning th at the tax typically exhibits little autom atic revenue
growth.
In practice there are several form s o f the property tax. For example, some
countries separate the taxation o f land and improvements, o r structures,
and a few others tax only land values o r rents. A lthough a tax on land tends
to be m ore efficient, it also has less revenue potential and it is generally
m ore difficult to adm inister properly, for example, in term s o f valuation or
assessm ent o f properties. There is an o th er type o f property tax in the form
o f 'b etterm en t levies’ o r lum p-sum paym ents exacted upfront by sub
national governm ents from land and housing developers and also from
hom eow ners as a charge for public service improvements, such as road
paving, drain infrastructure, sidewalks, street lights and so on, which all
have a visible benefit on property values. Betterm ent levies can be useful in
providing sub-national governm ents w ith liquidity to invest in needed
infrastructure; they also have the advantage o f being m ore directly con
tractual th an property taxes and therefore reinforcing the benefit principle
feature in sub-national governm ent financing.
There are different m odalities for the adm inistration o f the tax, includ
ing centralized o r central oversight over cadastres and re-evaluation
processes, which can m ake this type o f tax even feasible in developing coun
tries. N ote that tax autonom y is largely preserved as long as sub-national
authorities are given som e discretion over rate setting.27
6.1.3 Vehicle and transportation taxes
These are generally attractive sub-national taxes because o f the strong link
between the ow nership o f vehicles on the one hand, an d the use o f local
services and infrastructure (particularly roads) on the other. In addition,
sub-national taxes and charges on vehicles can counteract the negative
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externalities associated with local traffic congestion and air pollution in the
local area. This is also a tax th at tends to have elastic revenues. It is perhaps
for this reason that the central governm ents in some developing countries,
wrongly, tend to assign these taxes to themselves. There are, o f course, some
tran sp o rtatio n taxes such as in the case o f air travel, which are rightly allo
cated at the central level, since air traffic control and other sim ilar services
should be centrally provided.
6.1.4 Natural resource taxes (when resources are evenly distributed)
There is at least a partial link between taxes on natural resource extraction
and the benefit principle at the local level. N atural resource taxes can be
justified at the local level to the extent that extraction activities use local
infrastructure (e.g., roads needed to tran sp o rt heavy m achinery and mined
resources), place stress on oth er local infrastructure (tem porary worker
camps, hospital facilities required to treat injuries incurred by those working
in this industry and so on), and - depending on the type o f extraction - may
pollute the environm ent o r cause oth er negative externalities, increasing
health costs o f local residents. T here has been growing interest in the fiscal
decentralization literature in the pros and cons o f the assignm ent o f natural
resource revenues to sub-national governm ents.28 N otw ithstanding the
argum ents for some form o f local taxation o f natural resources, there are
two m ajor argum ents against it. First, in the case o f geographically con
centrated natural resources, local taxation could cause extensive horizontal
fiscal im balances (e.g., the recent cases o f Indonesia, N igeria and Russia).
These fiscal disparities can lead to inefficient population m igration and loca
tion o f business. Second, given the high volatility o f world com m odity
prices, local taxation o f natural resources would not constitute a stable
source o f revenue.
Therefore, some balance m ust be reached, especially in the case o f the
uneven geographical distrib u tio n o f resources, between first, centralized
taxation o f natu ral resources to address disparities and avoid o r correct for
negative econom ic externalities, an d second, sharing som e o f the revenues
with sub-national governm ents to com pensate for the environm ental
dam age o f the extraction process and so on.
6.1.5 Local business taxes
Certain forms o f business taxes or business license fees are justified at the
sub-national level as an indirect but adm inistratively easier way to tax
income o f business owners (especially non-wage incomes), and as a benefit
tax for the services and infrastructure provided by sub-national governments.
W here it is n o t feasible to recoup costs o f local governm ent services
through user charges, some form o f broad-based levy on general business
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activity is w arranted. However, to avoid econom ic distortions, the broadbased levy should be neutral to the factor mix, applying equally to labor
(payroll) and capital (assets) used by businesses. Such a tax, which is som e
times called a business value tax (BVT) is discussed by Bird (2003). The base
of the BVT would resemble that o f the VAT although the two taxes func
tion quite differently. In contrast to the destination-based VAT, the BVT
would be origin-based, therefore taxing exports (not im ports) because the
benefits from sub-national governm ents’ services acrue at the place o f pro
duction (not consum ption). In addition, while the typical VAT is calculated
by the subtraction m ethod on transactions (gross receipts m inus the cost o f
interm ediate goods and services), a BVT would be calculated by adding
payroll, interest, rents an d net profits on the basis o f annual accounts.
The closest exam ple o f a BVT in practice was Italy’s regional business
tax (know n as the IR A P ) prior to the elim ination o f payroll from the tax
base in 2003.29 A potential disadvantage o f a BVT is that it requires good
levels o f accounting and record-keeping and quite advanced tax adm inis
tration capacity. These requirem ents m ake it less o f an option for taxing
small business and for use in countries where tax adm inistration is not
sophisticated. A no th er feature that may help explain its lack o f popularity
is its overlap in term s o f the tax base with value-added taxes, and therefore
the hard political sell for this tax. An alternative to business taxation at the
sub-national level is to use charges that m ay vary by type, size o r location
o f the business. For example, Kenya has used this form o f a tax, called the
single business perm it, since 1999.
6.1.6

Excise taxes (subject to area size and cross-border trade and
smuggling limitations)
Subject to the area size, cross-border trad e and sm uggling limitations,
excise taxes have potential as piggyback taxes or special taxes at the su b 
national level. Excises tend to be m ore politically acceptable, can be easily
adm inistered in coordination with national wholesalers as w ithholding
agents and allow for rates differentiated by region. For example, some
O E C D countries allow sub-national governm ent surcharges on excises.30
Moreover, the benefit principle accords well with the assignm ent o f
(destination-based) excises on alcohol an d tobacco to the sub-national level
(to the extent that the latter is responsible for health care) and on vehicles
and fuel (to the extent o f sub-national governm ent involvement in road
construction and m aintenance). The ability to charge differential rates
across sub-national jurisdictions is, o f course, limited by the possibility of
cross-border trade an d smuggling. The extent to which excise piggyback
surtaxes can be used at the local level depends also on the technology of
product distribution and points o f sales.
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A n interesting aspect o f excise taxation at the sub-national level is the
taxation o f public utility services. T here is significant revenue potential in
some o f these services, as in the case o f electricity and phone services.
Besides revenue potential and adm inistrative ease, sub-national excises on
public utility services are attractive because o f the benefit principle. For
example, excises on electric consum ption and phone services should be in
m ost cases good proxies for the dem and o f local public services by both
households and enterprises. C om pared with other com m odities, taxation
o f public utilities would be associated with relatively low distortions, as
m ost utilities show relatively low price-elasticity o f dem and. Also, the
dem and for public utilities has been shown to be income elastic, which
brings tw o additional benefits to this form o f sub-national taxes: progressivity an d revenue buoyancy (L inn, 1983).
6.1.7 Flat-rate piggyback income taxes
As we have discussed above, progressive income taxes are best assigned at
the central governm ent level, because incom e redistribution should be an
objective pursued by the central governm ents because o f the m obility o f
taxpayers and so on. A no th er reason for this assignm ent is th a t progressive
income taxes tend to act as auto m atic econom ic stabilizers an d m acroeco
nom ic stabilization should prim arily be a function o f the central govern
m ent. N evertheless, there are several possibilities for the taxation o f
personal incom e by sub-national governm ents. T he m ost com m only used
form o f sub-national incom e taxation internationally is a flat-rate income
tax as a surtax o r ‘piggyback’ tax on the central governm ent personal
incom e tax. This type o f tax is alm ost always collected by the central gov
ernm ent adm inistration and shared on a derivation basis.31 To enhance
revenue autonom y, local governm ents may be allowed discretion in setting
the flat rate between m inim um an d m axim um rates, which are centrally leg
islated.32 A flat-rate local piggyback incom e tax easily satisfies the benefit
principle an d , being quite visible, it prom otes political responsibility and
accountability at the sub-national level. This is also an elastic tax with rev
enues increasing com m ensurate w ith income, so that as the dem and for
local services increases w ith incom e, so do tax revenues.
6.2

Worse Choices for Sub-national Taxes

As we have discussed, the principles o f tax assignment do not provide a
determ inistic list o f taxes, but those principles are helpful in identifying more
good choices, and also likely p oor choices. First, progressive personal income
taxes are not a good choice for tax assignm ent at the sub-national level; ulti
mately, it would seem to make little sense to have income redistribution only
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within the boundaries o f sub-national jurisdictions, since richer taxpayers
tend to live in richer jurisdictions. In addition, the mobility o f high-income
taxpayers and businesses could easily lead to distortion in the location o f
economic activity.
A n other tax that is ill-equipped for application at the sub-national level
is the corporate incom e tax or profit tax. This is a tax m ore appropriately
assigned to the central governm ent level because o f its link to m acroeco
nomic stabilization and, to the extent th at corporations are owned by
wealthy individuals, this tax also affects incom e redistribution. Perhaps
even m ore relevant, is th a t even when levied by the central governm ent, the
corporate income tax hardly meets sounds principles. There are no reasons
to believe that incorporated businesses benefit m ore from public services
than unincorporated ones o r that the benefits received vary with profits.
The m ain justification for a corporate incom e tax is to prevent avoidance
of individual income tax through incorporation and to w ithhold tax on
foreign shareholders, w ho otherw ise only may have to pay tax in their co u n 
tries o f residence. Clearly, it is adm inistratively easier to tax profits at source
rather th an as individual incom e after distribution am ong shareholders.
A t a m ore practical level, the assignm ent o f profit taxes at the central level
is justified by the difficulty o f apportioning well the profits o f enterprises
across sub-national jurisdictions where they operate. Some countries that
have corporate income taxes at the sub-national level attem pt to apportion
the nationw ide profits o f enterprises am ong sub-national jurisdictions using
a form ula. These apportionm ent form ulas generally use a weighted index o f
com binations o f three factors: payroll, assets and sales. But, despite these
formulas, the allocation o f profits across jurisdictions tends to be quite arbi
trary because o f the imprecise link between the location o f those factors and
the generation o f profits. In countries where no form ula is used, the typical
norm is to share the revenues between the central and sub-national govern
ments on a derivation basis, that is, according to the jurisdiction where the
taxes have been actually collected. This practice leads to an arbitrary distri
bution o f revenues, since the shared revenues stay in the very few jurisdic
tions where com panies are registered or have their headquarters. This means
that the capital o f the country and a few o th er large cities where enterprises
have their headquarters tend to benefit unfairly vis-a-vis jurisdictions where
the enterprises have factories and other form s o f econom ic activity that use
local resources and public services.
A nother tax that traditionally has been thought a poor choice for assign
ment to the sub-national level is the VAT. The main difficulty lies in the fact
that the debiting and crediting o f the VAT is likely to take place in different
sub-national jurisdictions, which generally will imply an arbitrary ap p o r
tionm ent o f VAT revenues across those jurisdictions.33 This also makes it
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problem atic to share VAT revenues with sub-national governments on a
derivation basis. However, it is perfectly feasible to share VAT revenues with
sub-national units using a form ula. For example, the VAT can be shared on
the basis o f population (as in G erm any and Belarus), or on the basis of
the regional shares in aggregate consum ption (as in C an ad a’s M aritime
Provinces, Japan or Spain).34 But, o f course, this form o f revenue-sharing
does little to enhance revenue autonom y o r accountability am ong sub
national governments. Nevertheless, in m ore recent years, there have been a
series o f developments in practice and at theoretical levels that clearly
dem onstrate that sub-national VATs on a destination basis using the invoicecredit m ethod are quite feasible. We review those developments next.
6.3

The Feasibility of Sub-national VATs

B road-based indirect taxes are attractive to sub-national governm ents
because o f their revenue potential. A lthough retail final sales taxes are still
used in som e countries, for exam ple at the state level in the U nited States,
the current consensus is th at a destination-based VAT is preferable to a
retail sales tax as a sub-national tax o p tio n especially when a national VAT
already exists (which, o f course, is not the case in the U nited States).35
However, the in troduction o f sub-national VATs is am ong the m ost
complex issues in the theory an d practice o f revenue assignments. Basically,
only three large federal countries have introduced sub-national VATs:
Brazil, C an ad a an d India. T he mixed experience from these countries has
served for m any years as an exam ple o f the difficulties facing any other
country contem plating the introduction o f a sub-national VAT. The best
experience so far is, no d o u b t, the Quebec Sales Tax (Q ST). This tax is
structured as a deferred-paym ent plus destination-based system and in
com bination with C a n a d a ’s federal G S T (goods and services tax) consti
tutes a truly operational ‘dual VAT’.36 On the other h and, Brazil’s statelevel VAT, know n by its initials in Portuguese as ICM S (Im posto Sobre
C irculagao de M ercadorias e Servitos), is an origin-based consum ption tax
that falls on m anufacturing goods and some services with different rates for
different goods in intra-state transactions an d either o f two rates used for
inter-state transactio n s (a lower rate for exports to less-developed states).
T he tax on interstate sales is fully creditable at the expense o f the im port
ing state. T he IC M S is a com plex system that so far has not worked well.37
T he introduction o f a functional VAT in India has been com plicated by
constitutional provisions regarding the taxation o f goods an d services at
the federal and state levels.38
W hat type o f VAT would be desirable at the sub-national level? There is
now wide consensus that the preferable form o f a sub-national VAT is a
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destination-based (as opposed to an origin-based) tax, not only because it
relates m ore directly to the benefit principle, but because it is less likely to
distort the location o f economic activity and because it does n o t lend itself
to undesirable practices, such as transfer pricing m anipulations.39 Using the
destination principle has two im portant im plications (M cLure, 2006). First,
the sub-national jurisdiction o f destination gets the revenues. Second, the
same final rate o f tax applies to consum ption o f a given com m odity in the
sub-national jurisdiction o f destination regardless o f where it is produced.
O ther desirable features o f a sub-national VAT besides being destinationbased include some discretion to set rates, sim ilar com pliance requirem ents
for intra- and inter-jurisdiction trades, and proper collection incentives.
T here are several approaches to im plem enting a destination-based sub
national VAT. The m ost imm ediate one, as practiced by national govern
ments in the case o f international trade, is bord er tax adjustm ents.
However, it is clear th at this approach is neither feasible nor desirable for
internal trade am ong sub-national jurisdictions. T he second approach is a
clearing-house arrangem ent. Here all sales (intra- and inter-jurisdiction)
are treated the sam e and registered im porters in oth er jurisdictions can
reclaim a credit from their own authorities for taxed inputs; periodically all
jurisdictions settle up an d clear net claims. The clearing-house arrangem ent
can be cum bersom e but it is actually practiced in Israel and the West Bank
and G aza Strip. T he m ain problem with the clearing-house arrangem ent is
that there are no incentives within the system to verify th at the claims
for refunds are legitimate. The third is the zero-rating/deferred payment
approach; here the sales to registered taxpayers in other states are zero
rated an d the tax on im ports is deferred until the im porter pays tax but, at
the sam e time, he also gets the credit for the tax on imports. This is the basic
m echanism used under the Q ST and it is also the ‘interim ’ solution that has
been in use in the E uropean U nion for cross-m em ber country transactions.
The essence o f the Quebec dual VAT (the provincial Q ST and the federal
G ST) is to handle interstate sales on a zero-rated, deferred paym ent basis
(Bird and G endron, 1998). This dual VAT is adm inistered by Q uebec’s
provincial authorities. T here is, however, an im portant role played by the
federal authorities. T his tax requires a well-functioning national VAT with
jo in t au d its and a high level o f inform ation exchange to work well. For
example, even though Quebec can n o t m onitor a zero-rated export to
an o th er province, the norm al process o f the federal audit serves as a check
that Quebec VAT has not been evaded. The institutional set-up provides
incentives for enforcem ent o f the provincial and federal taxes; in particu
lar, the Q ST is charged on a price inclusive o f the federal G S T basis.
T he adm inistrative problem o f im posing a destination-based sub
national VAT has attracted several recent contributions in the literature
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seeking creative solutions to sub-national VATs. The first o f these co n tri
butions is know n as the ‘com pensating VAT’ o r CVAT, first proposed by
V arsano (1995, 1999) for Brazil and expanded by M cL ure (2000b). The
CVAT preserves the zero rating o f sales between the sub-national jurisdic
tions but m aintains the VAT chain by instead charging a com pensating
VAT on all cross-border sales. This com pensating VAT is fully creditable to
the im porter, so that no jurisdiction would collect any net revenue from the
tax on interstate sales to registered traders. In addition, the adm inistration
o f the CVAT is to be com bined into the federal VAT; th at is, the CVAT
would be paid to th e federal governm ent an d then the im porter would
credit it against federal VAT due - o r get a refund. A significant advantage
o f the CVAT is th at it requires a fairly low level o f adm inistrative capacity.
However, it has the disadvantage o f the asym m etric treatm ent given to the
in-state an d out-of-state buyers.
The second co ntribution to the im plem entation o f a destination-based
sub-national VAT is the ‘viable integrated VAT' or VIVAT, initially pro
posed by Keen and Sm ith (1996) as a solution for the E uropean Union. The
VIVAT charges a VAT tax at a com m on rate on all transactions between all
registered traders, inside o f and outside o f the jurisdiction, while sales to
final consum ers and non-registered traders are taxed at the rate o f the ju ris
diction where the seller is located. A conspicuous advantage o f the VIVAT
is that it does not require the existence o f a federal VAT. However, it requires
the asym m etric treatm ent o f registered traders and final consumers.
In sum m ary, there are currently three viable options for a destinationbased sub-national VAT. W hile the dual VAT has been w orking in Quebec,
C an ad a, the CVAT and the VIVAT options have yet to be im plem ented.
Each o f the three optio n s presents advantages and disadvantages in term s
o f generally desirable traits o f a destination-based sub-national VAT. It is
desirable, for exam ple, th a t sellers d o n o t need to identify the destination
jurisdiction o r the type o f buyer in o rd er to charge the tax. O r it is also
desirable that the tax can be im plem ented w ithout the need for a central
agency adm inistering the process. W hen these and o ther desirable proper
ties are tallied, none o f the o ptions for a sub-national VAT is inherently
better th a n the others. T he choice o f the sub-national VAT will need to be
m ade according to existing co n strain ts and m ost desirable objectives.40

7

THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE WITH TAX
ASSIGNMENTS

T he international experience w ith revenue assignm ents shows great diver
sity o f approaches and, therefore, is n o t easily sum m arized. A useful way
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to view this international experience is along two m ain dimensions: first,
the form o f legislation an d effective use o f tax autonom y; and second, the
level o f decentralization in tax adm inistration arrangem ents. A ccording to
these dimensions, we can identify three m ain types o f tax assignment
m odels in the world practice.
The first is what we could call the ‘tax autonom y' m odel, prevalent in
C anada and the U nited States. These countries exhibit revenue assignm ents
with a great deal o f tax autonom y and independent legislation, and decen
tralized tax adm inistrations at the sub-national levels. In these two co u n 
tries, the same revenue bases are generally taxed by different levels o f
governm ent. This international model does not present harm onized tax
bases across sub-national jurisdictions, which results in relatively higher
taxpayer com pliance costs and adm inistration costs.
The second m odel we could call the ‘tax sharing/transfer’ model. This is
prevalent in a large num ber o f countries including A ustralia, Germany,
Russia and Spain. This model o f revenue assignm ent is characterized by
low tax autonom y and heavier reliance on tax-sharing and transfers. This
would also offer a variety o f tax adm inistration arrangem ents, mostly cen
tralized (A ustralia. Russia, Spain) but also exceptionally decentralized
(G erm any).
T he third m odel is the ‘piggyback taxes’ m odel, and it is prevalent in the
Scandinavian and o th e r N orthern and C entral E uropean countries. Here a
significant degree o f tax autonom y is achieved through surcharges o r pig
gyback taxes on central taxes, while this autonom y comes m ostly in the
form o f determ ining a flat surcharge rate. In this model the adm inistration
o f taxes at all levels rem ains highly centralized.

8

SUMMARY A N D CONCLUSIONS

Effective fiscal decentralization requires m eaningful levels o f revenue
au to n o m y at the regional an d local levels o f governm ent. These confer
ence notes review the theory and practice o f tax assignm ents, seeking to
answ er the questio n o f which taxes are b etter allocated to sub-national
jurisdictions.
Besides adequate revenues to fund the public expenditure needs o f sub
national governm ents, what we m ost w ant from revenue assignm ents is
accountability and political and fiscal responsibility for sub-national gov
ernm ent officials. This is fundam entally achieved by granting sub-national
governm ents a significant level o f tax autonom y. Achieving a good level of
tax autonom y has m any other benefits including the im position o f a hard
budget constraint on sub-national governments.
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However, the full financing o f sub-national governm ents from a u to 
nom ous tax sources is generally not feasible. T he com m only accepted com 
prom ise is th at sub-national governm ents need to raise their own funds at
the m argin an d operate with hard budget constraints; this m eans that
revenue-sharing and g rants should represent only infra-m arginal funding.
O perationally, this translates into the golden rule for revenue assignm ent:
own revenue sources should fund the expenditure needs (net o f conditional
grants) o f the wealthiest sub-national governm ents, and the revenue needs
o f the relatively poorer sub-national governm ent should be supplem ented
with equalization grants.
However, not all form s o f tax au tonom y are equally desirable. All things
considered, the best way to provide sub-national governm ents with tax
autonom y is to have a closed list o f taxes for which sub-national govern
m ents can set tax rates w ithin som e m inim um and m axim um values that are
nationally legislated. G o o d choices for sub-national governm ents include
m axim um use o f fees and charges for excludable services under the benefit
principle, plus a list o f well-suited taxes such as the property tax, vehicle
taxes and piggyback personal incom e taxes. Recent advances also make it
possible to introduce a sub-national VAT in either its dual Quebec-style
form , o r under the CVAT o r VIVAT forms.
The international experience clearly shows that there are no unique welldefined form ulas for revenue assignments. While there is ample revenue a u to n 
omy in N o rth America and countries in Scandinavia and in Central Europe,
many other decentralized countries around the world rely very heavily on
revenue-sharing and transfers to finance sub-national governments.
This latter situation continues to be puzzling. M ore research is needed to
understand the political econom y behind som e o f the anom alies in the
choices o f revenue assignm ents. In particular, it is im p o rtan t to better
understand why the w rong revenue assignm ents have proved so difficult to
change in a significant num ber o f countries and also why the little revenue
au th o rity provided to sub-national governm ents quite often goes unused
even though these governm ents m ight, at the same time, dem and m ore
funding. F u tu re research should be m ore heavily focused on the political
econom y o f revenue assignm ents.
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See, for example, Martinez-Vazquez, McLure and Vaillancourt (2006).
See Burki, Perry and Dillinger (1999) for the experience of some Latin American coun
tries.
See Bahl and Linn (1992). Prior knowledge o f expenditure assignments can also help to
better design revenue assignments because different services may call for different forms
o f financing. Some services (public utilities, bus transportation) can be financed by user
charges while other services characterized by significant externalities, should be financed
from region-wide taxes and intergovernmental transfers.
See McLure (1998) and Bird (2000).
See M cLure (2001) for the role o f history in revenue assignments.
A num ber of recent studies (e.g., Ter-Minassian, 1997; Ebel and Yilmaz. 2002) suggest
that outcomes o f decentralized spending depend on the form of financing used for these
expenditures, with a crucial aspect being the extent o f control that local governments can
exercise over the sources of their revenue.
A hard budget constraint implies that those local governments given autonom y will be
asked to balance their budgets without recourse to any end-of-year assistance from the
central government and a ciear- understanding that there will be ‘no bailout’ at year-end
o r in the case o f debt default. See Rodden, Eskel and Litvack (2003).
Traditionally it has been thought that greater sub-national revenue autonom y may com 
promise the ability o f the center to implement stabilization policies; in reality, the reverse
seems to happen. It could be that greater sub-national revenue autonom y leads to more
conservative budget policies and lower deficits at all levels of government. See MartinezVazquez and M cNab (2006).
This argument is made very clearly in McLure (1998).
See Bird and Ebel (2007) on the possibilities and problems with asymmetric fiscal feder
alism.
See Musgrave(1983); Boadway (1997); Norregard (1997); McLure (1998 and 2000a) and
Bird (2000).
The international experience shows that providing sub-national governments with
freedom to select their own taxes (the open-list approach) can easily backfire when sub
national governments introduce highly inefficient (distortionary) forms o f taxation. A
recent example is provided by Indonesia, which adopted an open-list approach in the
2001 decentralization reform. See Aim. Martinez-Vazquez and Indrawati (2004).
See Dahlby and Wilson (1996, 2003); Keen (1998) and Boadway, M archand and
Vigneault (1998).
See. for example. Flowers (1988); Dahlby (1996); Boadway et al. (1998) and Keen (1998).
T he ability to change either base o r rate opens up the possibility o f fiscal competition
am ong sub-national governments fWilson, 1999). Inter-jurisdictional fiscal com peti
tion can have both good aspects, such as offering choices to taxpayers and keeping
public officials m ore accountable, and also bad aspects, such as a ‘run to the bottom ’
type o f behavior actually taking place in countries with a significant degree o f sub
national tax autonom y. In addition, the ability to change tax base o r rate can give rise
to ‘horizontal’ fiscal externalities, whereby the policies o f one jurisdiction (for example,
raising tax rates) can have an effect on the tax bases o f other jurisdictions (raising their
tax bases related to mobile taxpayers). Intergovernmental grants and o ther policies can
be implemented by the central government to correct horizontal fiscal externalities.
See, for example, A m o tt and Grieson (1981); G ordon (1983) and Wildasin (1983,
1989).
See M artinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2005).
See, for example, Martinez-Vazquez and Boex (2001) and Martinez-Vazquez, Timofeev
and Boex (2006).
The regional governments may keep the centrally designed tax schedule, in which case
they will receive 33 per cent o f the total tax take, or they may increase or reduce the rates
but with the requirement that the rate schedule be a progressive tax with the same
num ber o f brackets as in the central government's income tax. In addition, the regional
governments may also establish their own tax credits, which would only affect their
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differential tax take. In practice, regional governments have changed tax credits and not
the tax rate schedule. See Lopez-Laborda, M artinez-Vazquez and M onasterio (2007).
Otherwise, when decisions on economic stabilization and income distribution are left to
the local governments, wrong incentives and conflicts may arise, and policies may be
ineffective and unsustainable.
See, for example, M cLure (1998).
However, despite the wide agreement on the advantages o f the property tax as a sub
national tax. sub-national governments in developing and transitional countries make
relatively little use o f the property tax. On average, transitional and developing countries
raise property tax revenues that are equivalent to only about 0.6 percent o f GDP. See
Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2007) for an investigation o f this puzzle.
The balance between the services received by property owners and the property taxes
they pay on their real estate typically can be capitalized into property values. T hat is,
property taxes do not have to reduce the market value o f dwellings if the general per
ception is that the quality o f services provided by the local government is good.
See Bahl and Linn (1992) and Sennoga, Sjoquist and Wallace (2007).
O f course, low interest may also reflect the perception that the property tax is complex
and has low revenue potential vis-a-vis its associated political costs, although there are
exceptions (for example. C hina, Indonesia and Jamaica).
Being ‘house rich and income p oor’can be a problem for elderly people. Some countries
use special exemption schemes ('hom estead exemptions’ or ‘circuit breakers’) to increase
equity in the implementation o f property taxes.
For international experience with the property tax see Bird and Slack (2004) and Bahl
and Martinez-Vazquez (2007).
See, for example, M cLure (1996) and Bahl and Tumennasan (2004).
See Keen (2003). The 1RAP (Im posta Regionale sulle Activita Produttive) is payable by
businesses on the am ount their sales exceed the sum o f their material purchases and
depreciation. This is an origin-based income-type (no full deduction for investment)
VAT administered by the subtraction m ethod centrally. Regions have discretion on rates.
Although it has many good features o f a benefit tax, it has proven to be quite unpopu
lar with taxpayers.
For example, in the Netherlands, provinces impose a surcharge on the m otor vehicle tax
levied by the central government. Provinces are free to set the rate o f the surcharge,
subject to a ceiling imposed by the central government.
Generally speaking, a local income tax should be levied at the place o f residence because
it is there where most taxpayers consum e sub-national government services. However,
because o f administrative convenience, sub-national piggyback taxes are often withheld
at source at the place o f work by employees. However, it is quite feasible to distribute the
funds according to where workers reside.
Other forms o f tax autonom y are practiced, such as the ability to modify the base o f
the tax by providing more or less deductions, exemptions and so on.
Revenue-sharing on a derivation basis for the VAT also means that, as in the case for the
sharing o f corporate income taxes, the tax tends to be paid according to the place o f reg
istration or the location o f the headquarters o f business firms.
In the case o f C anada’s harmonized sales tax for the Maritime Provinces, all three
provinces have a uniform rate that piggybacks on the federal VAT.
See Fox and Luna (2003) for a discussion o f the issues.
See Bird and Gendron (1998).
See Varsano (1995, 1999).
See Bahl et al. (2005).
A destination-based VAT is a tax on consum ption in the taxing jurisdiction (it taxes
imports but not exports), while an origin-based tax is a tax on production in the taxing
jurisdiction (it taxes exports but not im ports).
See Bird and Gendron (2000); Keen (2000), Keen and Smith (2000) and M cLure (2006)
for an animated discussion o f the advantages and disadvantages o f the dual VAT. CVAT
and VIVAT.
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